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Clinging to my turtle 
A rejoinder to Richard Bellamy and Adrienne Stone 
 
Cormac Mac Amhlaigh* 
Richard Bellamy and Adrienne Stone have provided thoughtful responses to my 
article “Putting Political Constitutionalism in its Place.”1 I am very grateful to them 
for taking the time to engage with my argument as well as the editorial board of 
I•CON for organizing the responses and allowing me this brief rejoinder. 
The argument I defend in the article, in a nutshell, is that given the fact that we 
should expect disagreement about whether legislative supremacy is the fairest way to 
make decisions about rights, arguments about legislative supremacy require 
something more if they are not to descend into infinite regress (“turtles all the way 
down”)2 and therefore become self-defeating. In the article, I propose a minimal 
theory of legitimacy as an additional element of a theory of political constitutionalism 
in order to deal with this problem. The minimal theory provides a presumption in 
favor of the legitimacy of a reasonably just, reasonably effective governing regime all 
other things being equal. Both responses identify two worries with this position. The 
first worry is that we will also probably disagree about whether the minimal theory is, 
itself, sufficient for the legitimacy of a governing regime; and the second worry is that 
we will disagree about the point at which the presumption in favor of the legitimacy 
of the minimal theory will be defeated.  
The first worry involves the contention that, in using a minimal theory of 
legitimacy to respond to the problems I argue affect political constitutionalism, I am 
hoist with my own petard given that this can be turned back on the minimal theory 
itself—there will reasonable disagreement as to whether the minimal theory is 
adequate for the legitimacy of a governing regime, thereby undermining the potential 
of the minimal theory to plug the infinite regress which was the basis of my own 
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critique of political constitutionalism. Bellamy elaborates on this worry in 
considerable detail arguing that in positing the minimal theory I am attempting to 
appeal directly to a Hartian “noble dream” of a “correct” understanding of legitimacy3 
by “promoting a certain moral ideal [the minimal theory] outside of politics, in the 
sense of being beyond reasonable disagreement.”4 As such, for Bellamy, my minimal 
theory of legitimacy precludes the asking of “sensible first order political questions 
about the capacity of different systems to continue to be seen as legitimate in the type 
of societies we live in and the forms of disagreement they generate.”5 In this type of 
debate, Bellamy concludes, political constitutionalism can make a(n) (independent) 
substantive contribution by “showing the normative necessity and worth of such 
[political engagement]” through its adoption of the logic of “equal respect and 
concern”.6  
Bellamy’s critique is pointed, and if sound, is devastating for my argument. 
However, I think that he misses an important aspect of my use of the minimal theory 
of legitimacy in relation to political constitutionalism. In short, I do not believe that I 
am claiming that the minimal theory is, itself, beyond contestation, nor that it would 
not be subject to disagreement. In the article, I stress that a reasonably effective and 
reasonably just “governing totality” enjoys a presumption in favor of its legitimacy. 
There are two points worth clarifying here. First, whereas there may be disagreement 
as to the “reasonableness” of the justice of particular regimes—many obviously 
odious regimes may achieve the level of effectiveness and stability envisaged by the 
minimal theory—I do not assume that all effective governing regimes are necessarily 
legitimate. Rather, I argue that the types of regimes to which theories of political 
constitutionalism apply as envisaged by Bellamy (and Waldron)—reasonably just and 
reasonably well-working non-pathological constitutional democracies7—can enjoy 
this presumption. Second, the presumption in the minimal theory is precisely that, a 
presumption, not a definitive reason for the legitimacy of a particular regime. As I 
argue in the article, the presumption is defeasible in the face of weightier 
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countervailing reasons. As such, the minimal theory offers merely pro tanto as 
opposed to conclusive reasons for the legitimacy of the status quo in reasonably just 
and reasonably effective regimes. This feature of my argument, I believe, makes clear 
that I do not claim to have discovered an “Archimedean point”8 of legitimacy nor that 
the minimal theory is beyond politics or contestation. Rather, it recognizes, indeed 
presumes, that disagreement will emerge as to the legitimacy of the minimal theory; 
in some ways that is precisely the point of the minimal theory.  
The second worry, related to the first, is described in more detail by Stone and 
challenges my argument by claiming that we will expect disagreement to emerge as to 
when the “tipping point” of the minimal theory is reached; that is that we will 
disagree as to when, precisely, the presumption in favor of the (reasonably just and 
reasonably effective) status quo is no longer valid. In the article I recognize that the 
question of the tipping point is a complex issue, and it is true that I do not attempt to 
provide an answer to this question. Rather, I offer the views of others (Copp and 
Michelman) on this issue to illustrate that it may be higher than may be initially 
assumed. 9 In light of Stone’s pressing of this issue, I would like to take the 
opportunity, then, to elaborate a little further on this question.  
What I would argue in response to this challenge is that in the face of 
disagreement about the tipping point of the loss of legitimacy of a reasonably 
effective and just governing regime, the specific question of the legitimacy of 
legislative or judicial supremacy will be a contingent one. As such, whatever the 
tipping point at which a regime can be considered to lose its minimal legitimacy in a 
reasonably just, reasonably effective governing regime, about which we will 
reasonably disagree, the question of legal or political or legal constitutionalism, by 
itself, will have little to contribute to that question. This is at the same time a strong 
and a weak claim; it is a strong claim in that I contend that, all other things being 
equal, the reasons marshaled in favor of legislative supremacy are insufficient to tip 
the balance in favor of change in a regime which practices judicial supremacy (and 
vice versa); and it is a weak claim in the sense that the overall legitimacy of a regime 
is bracketed to limit the question of legitimacy to the domain of legislative and 
judicial supremacy (the legitimacy—and particularly its loss—of a governing regime 
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obviously being a much broader and more complex issue than this). However, I don’t 
believe I need address this broader issue to support my claims about political 
constitutionalism. I do not have the space to elaborate fully on this point in this brief 
rejoinder, however I can illustrate this by referring to Stone’s example of Australia’s 
treatment of its indigenous populations.10 The question of the “tipping point” of the 
legitimacy of the Australian state will turn, I argue, on the substantive question of the 
(lack of) protection of the rights of indigenous Australians and not whether they are 
protected through political or judicial means. It may be the case that in the Australian 
context they could be better protected by one means than the other; but I would argue 
that this is contingent matter in the overall substantive question of the effective 
protection of the rights of indigenous Australians. 
I look forward to more debate on this topic, however, if there is one core 
message that I wished to get across in the article, it was what I believe to be the 
contingency of the question of legislative or judicial supremacy to the legitimacy of 
decision-making in the circumstances of politics. I still believe that this argument 
holds and in this respect, with thanks to the challenges from Bellamy and Stone, I will 
be clinging to my turtle. 
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